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1. Introduction
The threat of an underperforming firm being acquired by a new management team imposes a 
discipline on both the public capital markets and the firm’s operations. In addition to mergers, 
acquisitions and takeovers, a corporate buyout is also considered to be one of the major mecha-
nisms for harnessing control (Manne, 1965). In Australia, the market for corporate control is well 
developed. The global private equity investment sector, prior to the market collapse in late-2007, 
experienced unparalleled activity and unprecedented levels of growth. In the first half of 2007, 
private equity accounted for approximately 25% of world-wide merger and acquisition activity by 
value. In 2006, global leveraged buyouts (LBO) amounted to over US$800 billion, more than 
double the level in the previous year and more than six times higher than in the year 2000. The 
value of Australian private equity transactions announced and endorsed by target company boards 
also surged, reaching to AU$26 billion in 2006, compared to an average of approximately AU$2 
billion in the period 2000–2005,1 an indication of their increasing importance for corporate con-
trol in the Australian financial landscape.
Given this increasing importance and the associated growing level of interest that private 
equity transactions in Australia attract, arguably we require an improved understanding of this 
investment sector. However, to date, research on private equity research, particularly in the 
Australian context, has been relatively limited. To this end, this study investigates the govern-
ance structures which characterise Australian private equity bids, with the aim of identifying in 
more detail those which are attractive as private equity takeover bids. By examining the corpo-
rate governance attributes of private equity takeover target firms relative to those of corporate 
target firms, we seek to further inform the debate regarding the true nature of the going-private 
transaction, friendly versus hostile, and provide additional insights into how private equity 
players select their targets.
While a substantial quantity of empirical literature has endeavoured to characterise private 
equity, there still remains no classic, consistent definition. Prior research tends to present a plethora 
of differing private equity interpretations, each dependent upon the specific needs and constraints 
of the individual paper. For the purpose of this study, the term private equity refers to:
…the acquisition of a public firm, by a group of sophisticated investors, who take the company ‘private’ 
by delisting it from the stock exchange.1
This definition is extracted from the Reserve Bank of Australia’s (RBA) 2007 Financial Stability 
Review and is consistent with the definition employed by Chapple et al. (2010), in their Australian 
private equity research.
Prior studies recognise some generally accepted theories regarding the motivations of partici-
pants involved in traditional merger and acquisition deals. Typically, the empirical literature 
regards the motivations for conventional takeovers as either synergistic or disciplinary (Morck 
et al., 1988). Synergistic acquisitions are often documented as friendly in nature, with the key 
motivating force being the potential benefits (synergies) that may be derived (Martin and 
McConnell, 1991). Disciplinary takeovers are somewhat different. They are commonly associated 
with hostile bids and are conventionally viewed as a key mechanism for disciplining underper-
forming managers (Manne, 1965; Weisbach, 1992). Underperforming management, in the sense 
that the firm’s decision makers are not pursuing shareholder wealth maximisation strategies, is 
often a direct result of a misalignment of interests between a firm’s shareholders and its managers 
(Jensen and Meckling, 1976). In the presence of less effectual corporate governance structures, this 
misalignment can give rise to value-eroding agency costs. Thus, the primary way in which a 
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disciplinary takeover derives value is by realigning the interests of a firm’s owners and managers, 
thereby, mitigating agency costs (Jensen, 1986).
In this regard, Chapple et al. (2010) and Weir et al. (2006) assert that the going-private trans-
action occupies a homogenous place in the market, where its role appears to be as a disciplinary, 
friendly acquirer. In particular, the hallmarks of the Australian private equity investment sector, 
as outlined by the Australian Private Equity and Venture Capital Association Limited (AVCAL) 
and echoed by the RBA, the Australian Council for Super Investors (ACSI) and Austin and Tuch 
(2008), are highly suggestive of the disciplinary motivation for takeovers, as presented in the 
classic literature (Jensen, 1988). This suggests that private equity transactions possess character-
istics which resemble neither purely traditional friendly, nor purely conventional disciplinary 
takeovers. Further, given that private equity bidders typically do not focus simply on one spe-
cific industry, the synergistic motivation for a private equity takeover is somewhat less palatable 
(Chapple et al., 2010). Hence, Chapple et al. (2011) expanded their research by examining first 
and second order indications of bid friendliness, in an attempt to substantiate the friendly nature 
of private equity transactions. Both Chapple et al. (2011) and Weir et al. (2006) argue that private 
equity bidders occupy a unique place in the market where their role appears to be as ‘discipli-
nary, friendly acquirers’.
Firms which encounter hostile bids are theoretically expected to be characterised by less effec-
tual governance structures and hence substantial agency costs (Shivdasani, 1993; Weir et al., 2006; 
Weisbach, 1992). Jensen (2007) argues that private equity enables the capture of value destroyed 
by agency problems, particularly in the mature segment of the market. To date, however, no formal 
academic investigation into the disciplinary nature of Australian private equity bids has been con-
ducted. Due to the sector’s recent growth, heightened level of media attention and sparse empirical 
literature, such a study is justified. The statistical research design used in this paper affords an in-
depth inspection of private equity target firm characteristics and compares such attributes to a 
control sample of firms targeted by non-private equity bidders.
As fiscal year 2010 began, private equity in the domestic marketplace, much like the private 
equity investment sector around the world, appeared to be mired in a deep cyclical downturn.2 
Capital to finance new going-private transactions had all but dried up and portfolio-companies’ 
balance sheets were not looking as strong as they once had. However, if the financial press is any 
indication of things to come, all signs point to a return to mergers and acquisition and initial public 
offering (IPO) activities at a level not seen since pre-recessionary times.3 This paper is thus further 
motivated by the anticipated forthcoming resurgence of domestic and international private equity.
This study uses extant literature on empirical mergers and acquisitions, corporate governance 
and going-private activities to develop propositions to investigate the implicit hostility in the 
Australian private equity investment sector. In particular, we hypothesise that private equity target 
firms are characterised by less effectual governance structures in terms of board structure, owner-
ship structure and managerial power, when compared to the corporate governance structures of 
conventional corporate takeover targets.4 We test our expectations using a sample of 43 publicly 
listed private equity target firms and a benchmark control sample of 182 conventional corporate 
targets, matched by year and industry, for the period 2001–2010. Our univariate analysis reveals 
significant differences between the corporate governance characteristics of private equity firms 
and the corporate governance structure present in the matched corporate sample. Specifically, we 
find that, relative to our benchmark sample, private equity firms have larger boards and a greater 
number of audit committee, compensation committee and board meetings. Further, we find that 
firms which attract bids from private equity partnerships are typically characterised by a higher 
level of insider ownership, when compared to the corporate sample. Conversely, we find no sig-
nificant differences between the ownership compositions of private equity and corporate targets. 
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The multivariate testing results indicate that private equity targets are more likely to have boards 
which perform a less effectual monitoring role and top management which is more likely to be 
entrenched in the firm. Here, we find that both the number of board insiders and the size of the 
board are inversely related to the likelihood of a private equity takeover bid. In addition, we find 
a positive relation between CEO shareholdings and the probability of a private equity takeover 
offer. Consistent with our univariate analysis, we find no evidence of a difference between the 
ownership structures of private equity and matched corporate targets.
This study is similar to those of Chapple et al. (2010, 2011) and Osborne et al. (2012) who sought 
insights into the nature of private equity transactions in Australia and elsewhere by studying target 
firm characteristics such as size, profitability and cash flow. However, it is an extension of these 
studies, in several important ways. To the best of our knowledge there has been no formal research 
conducted which seeks to explain the relationship between Australian private equity transactions 
and target firm corporate governance structures. Thus the innovation of this paper rests in the unex-
plored relation between the disciplinary theory of takeovers and the Australian private equity invest-
ment sector. It also strengthens the limited empirical private equity literature by assessing the 
homogeneity of firms which attract private equity attention. This study examines target firm corpo-
rate governance characteristics and compares these data across a sample comprising private equity 
bids and a sample of control firm targets. As such, the sheer size and growth of the private equity 
investment sector in recent years renders this topic not only material, but also current.
Compared to Chapple et al. (2010, 2011), our study uses a unique, hand collected larger data set 
to examine the homogenous governance attributes of Australian private equity target firms. 
Chapple et al. (2010) study a sample of 23 listed private equity targets during 2001–2007 and a 
matched benchmark sample of 81 corporate targets; our sample includes 43 publicly listed private 
equity target firms and a matched benchmark control sample of 182 conventional corporate targets 
for the period 2001–2010. We argue that the results of this study should be of interest to a number 
of market commentators, including, but not limited to, industry practitioners, policy-makers and 
academics. Professionals can benefit from this study because it focuses on material, current events 
occurring in the Australian marketplace and offers a comprehensive understanding of private 
equity target firm selection. Similarly, this research is also likely to be of benefit to those Australian 
policy-makers who have been closely monitoring the impact of an increased private equity pres-
ence in Australia. Lastly, it sets a platform for incremental studies dealing with the Australian 
mergers and acquisition and private equity markets.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 presents private equity’s institu-
tional setting by analyzing the typical structure of a private equity fund and introducing the various 
viewpoints held by Australian market commentators in relation to the private equity investment 
sector. Section 3 reviews the literature on takeover and corporate governance, leading to the devel-
opment of our hypotheses. Section 4 describes the econometric model and empirical measures and 
Section 5 presents the relevant data. Section 6 presents the empirical results and, finally, Section 7 
offers our conclusions.
2. Institutional setting
Unlike previous private equity ‘boom’ periods, such as the leveraged buyout boom of the late-
1980s, private equity’s most recent expansion appeared to be a truly universal phenomenon, with 
unusual activity not concentrated solely in the United States but also rampant throughout Europe 
and the Asia Pacific.5 Fuelled by international trends, favourable macroeconomic conditions and 
low global interests rates, Australia’s private equity investment sector reached record levels in 
2006–2007.6
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2.1. Features of private equity funds
Private equity is an investment asset which encompasses a broad range of private takeover transac-
tions, including, but not limited to: management buyouts (MBOs); leveraged buyouts (LBOs); ven-
ture capital (VC); mid-stage company financing; and distressed firm investment.7 For the purpose of 
this study, we use the terms private equity, corporate buyout and going-private takeover interchange-
ably, in order to encompass transactions such as LBOs and MBOs. In the Australian takeover market, 
the majority of going-private transactions can be appropriately described as either LBOs or MBOs.8
Private equity partnerships are characterised by a number of defining attributes which explicitly 
differentiate them from conventional corporate bidders. For instance, unlike many typical corpo-
rate takeover bidders, virtually all private equity funds are structured as limited partnerships. These 
partnerships comprise a private equity fund manager who acts as a general partner (GP) and large 
‘sophisticated’ investors, who act as limited partners (LPs) (Metrick and Yasuda, 2010). The GPs 
oversee the fund’s investments and are ultimately liable for any legal debts and obligations. For 
their services, fund managers are compensated via management fees derived from both the size of 
the fund and the performance of the investments. The LPs, on the other hand, are ‘sophisticated’ 
(rather than retail) investors who provide the majority of a fund’s equity capital. Before deciding 
whether to invest in a particular private equity fund or which specific buyout fund to invest in, LPs 
typically undertake due diligence of the GPs, often over a number of years, in order to assess their 
‘track record’. LP investors generally include, but are not limited to, superannuation/pension funds, 
insurance companies, banks and university endowments.
Buyout funds are typically ‘closed-end’ rather than ‘ever-green’, meaning that they are estab-
lished for a pre-determined fixed period of time. Such limited partnerships usually last for periods 
of up to 10 to 12 years, after which all fund investments are realised and returned to investors. The 
long-term nature of the typical private equity fund aptly reflects the long-term investment focus of 
the typical GP. Subsequently, buyout funds offer very little in the way of investment liquidity.
Realised returns from private equity funds are derived from the sale of portfolio companies. 
Due to the finite nature and limited partnership structure of the typical private equity fund, GPs 
manage the investments with a beneficial sale in mind. There are three primary exit strategies 
available to private equity funds: ‘initial public offerings’ (IPO), ‘trade sales’, or ‘secondary sales’, 
the most popular of which is the IPO (Masulis and Thomas, 2009). As a result, private equity part-
nerships prefer to operate in environments characterised by healthy exchange-traded markets.
AVCAL contends that the level of returns typically targeted by the Australian private equity 
investment sector is five hundred basis points above that of the returns generated by public equity 
markets. Australia’s private equity returns have been largely consistent with this target. Successful 
private equity funds, those that have earned their cost-of-capital after payments to GPs (Metrick 
and Yasuda, 2010), attract new LPs to subsequent funds, because the GP’s performance is inter-
preted as ‘skill’ rather than ‘luck’.
However, perhaps the important distinctive feature of the private equity fund is the level of debt 
commonly employed in order to magnify its buying power. Renneboog and Simons (2005) posit 
that virtually all private equity transactions are financed by borrowing substantially beyond indus-
try gearing averages. Aside from being able to make additional investments with a given allotment 
of capital, fund managers are also able to earn LPs a higher rate of return on their invested capital. 
This feature is especially pronounced in LBOs.
2.2. Hallmarks of the Australian private equity investment sector
Several market commentators have attempted to delineate the unique hallmarks that characterise the 
Australian private equity investment sector. These hallmarks, proposed by policy-makers, 
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professionals and academics, not only summarise the primary objectives and goals of this distinctive 
asset class but also distinguish it from alternative methods of attaining corporate control. By inves-
tigating such characteristics, one is able to acquire a more comprehensive understanding of the typi-
cal nature of private equity, as perceived by differing market commentators. Prior literature such as 
Chapple et al. (2010) has even used such characteristics as a research framework to investigate tar-
get firm attributes and takeover bid similarities.
Appendix 1 presents the distinctive characteristics of the Australian private equity investment 
sector, as viewed by four differing market commentators. Perhaps the key feature of Appendix 1 is 
the striking similarities between the private equity characteristics described by these commentators 
(AVCAL, RBA, Austin and Tuch (2008) and ACSI). These aforementioned hallmarks of private 
equity investment suggest that policy-makers, academics and professionals share a common per-
spective regarding the motivations and benefits of private equity. For instance, all four commenta-
tors suggest that one of the key attributes of the Australian private equity investment sector relates 
to the alignment of interests between a firm’s managers and equity holders. Another distinguishing 
characteristic of the private equity investment sector, identified by a number of commentators, 
concerns the long-term focus of the fund. Finally, a number of commentators comment on the 
disciplinary effect of debt. These hallmarks are also consistent with the qualitative empirical litera-
ture on the private equity investment sector (Austin and Tuch, 2008; Masulis and Thomas, 2009).
The hallmarks put forward by the aforementioned commentators appear to be consistent with, 
and highly suggestive of, the disciplinary (hostile) theory of takeovers (Jensen, 1988). The disci-
plinary theory of takeovers, also termed the inefficient management hypothesis, as put forward by 
Manne (1965) and Jensen and Meckling (1976), describes a scenario in which underperforming 
managers – those not pursuing Manne’s (1965) ‘shareholder wealth maximization strategies’ – are 
effectively penalised by the market and replaced by alternative management teams, who believe 
they can govern the company more effectively. Jensen (1986) identifies the agency problem, 
endemic in the modern corporation, and argues that the disciplinary takeover can effectively rea-
lign the interests of shareholders and managers, eliminating value-eroding agency costs.
3. Literature review and hypotheses development
Corporate governance structures are used by firms in an attempt to re-align the interests of owners 
and managers, essentially mitigating the agency problem endemic in listed firms. With ineffectual 
governance structures, the interests of managers are expected to deviate from those of the owners, 
providing management the opportunity to pursue non-value-maximising goals. Accordingly, 
Shivdasani (1993) and Weisbach (1992) contend that firms characterised by weaker corporate gov-
ernance structures are more likely to be targeted by hostile bids. To analyze the hostile nature of 
private equity takeover bids, we investigated the corporate governance structures prevalent in pri-
vate equity target firms. It is our contention that the corporate governance structures present in 
private equity targets perform a less effectual role than those present in conventional corporate 
takeover targets. Referring to Larcker et al. (2007), Chan and Emanuel (2011), and Shivdasani 
(1993), we identified three distinct categories of target firm corporate governance: board structure; 
ownership structure; and managerial power. Below, we construct hypotheses relating to each of 
these three categories of target firm corporate governance.
3.1. Board structure
The board of directors is considered to be the ‘apex body’ of an organisation’s internal governance 
system, with responsibilities that include the monitoring of management, the setting of 
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compensation structures and the provision of key directions regarding investment and financing 
decisions (Fama and Jensen, 1983). It has also been viewed as the first-line of defence against an 
incumbent manager (Weisbach, 1992) and at least the second-best efficient solution for the share-
holders in monitoring management (Hermalin and Weisbach, 2003).
Due to the typically diffuse ownership nature of today’s listed corporation, John and Senbet 
(1998) contend that the firm’s equity holders may lack the motivation and incentive to perform an 
appropriate or credible monitoring role over top management, as well as lacking sufficient owner-
ship interest to justify the expenditure of resources necessary to monitor management closely. 
Here, the board of directors is presumed to fulfil the role of monitoring top management on behalf 
of the shareholders. Without it, the burden of monitoring management to ensure they are pursuing 
Manne’s (1965) ‘shareholder wealth maximization strategies’, would rest solely with the firm’s 
equity holders.
The effectiveness of a board’s monitoring role can be determined by a number of board-related 
factors, including its size, independence, overall composition of insider/outsider directors and 
number of board/committee meetings (Larcker et al., 2007). Logically, a more effectual board 
structure should perform a more effectual monitoring role. While much debate surrounds the con-
cept of an ‘optimal’ board structure, the empirical literature concurs that there are factors which 
depreciate the monitoring function ability of a company’s board and hence weaken the board of 
directors as a corporate governance structure (Larcker et al., 2007). Such factors include, but are 
not limited to, a large board size, a large percentage of inside directors on the board, and fewer 
board or committee meetings. For instance, for Australian firms, Christensen et al. (2014) observed 
a positive association between independent directors and firm performance, while Christy et al. 
(2013) noted a negative association between the proportion of independent directors and firm risk.
A firm which is monitored by a less effectual board of directors is more likely to be character-
ised by a misalignment of interests between the management and owners. Shivdasani (1993) sug-
gests that firms characterised by weaker corporate governance structures are more likely to be 
targeted by hostile bids. He argues that the probability of a disciplinary takeover bid is inversely 
related to a board’s ability to monitor effectively. Further, Weir and Wright (2006) suggest that less 
effectual corporate governance structures, relating to a firm’s board of directors, increase the likeli-
hood that a firm is taken private. The preceding discussion forms the basis for our first hypothesis 
(stated in the alternate):
H1: Firms targeted by private equity have less effectual board structures when compared with 
those of conventional corporate takeover targets.
3.2. Ownership structure
A second corporate governance mechanism that warrants investigation is the shareholder owner-
ship structure. A firm’s ownership structure refers to the specific composition and concentration of 
its equity holders. Concurrent with the market for corporate control and a firm’s board of directors, 
ownership structure is a primary avenue through which shareholders can effectively exert control 
over top management. Individuals or institutions which possess large ownership stakes are moti-
vated to monitor the actions of managers and hence, exercise greater control (Demsetz and Lehn, 
1985). Accordingly, shareholder ownership composition, as an external corporate governance 
structure, has the potential to realign the interests of shareholders and managers through improved 
monitoring.
Grossman and Hart (1980) document the free-rider theory as a monitoring problem inherent in 
listed corporations with dispersed shareholder structures. The delegation of power from many to 
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just a few creates a fundamental problem in which only a selected number of individuals is suffi-
ciently motivated to devote sufficient resources to ensure that representatives are acting in the 
interests of the represented. Since the representatives are serving a ‘public good’, the social benefit 
of monitoring is far greater than the private benefit to any one individual. As a result, individual 
shareholders owning smaller equity stakes may underinvest in monitoring activities, believing that 
‘someone else will do it’ (Renneboog and Simons, 2005).
Bearle and Means (1932) and then Jensen and Meckling (1976) hypothesise that firm value is a 
function of a firm’s ownership structure. Large external shareholders have an increased incentive 
to oversee managerial activities because their proportionately larger share holdings encourage 
them to monitor and, if need be, discipline top management (Demsetz and Lehn, 1985; Shleifer and 
Vishny, 1986). Firms with more diffuse ownership have a greater number of individual sharehold-
ers, each with smaller residual claims and, given the cost-benefit tradeoff, a diminished incentive 
to monitor management’s actions (Grossman and Hart, 1980). As the number of substantial share-
holders in a firm’s ownership structure increases, the greater the collective individual wealth at 
stake and hence the more resources that are likely to be expended to monitor management.
We assert that agency costs are effectively mitigated by an increased concentration of a firm’s 
ownership structure and so, by inference, a diffuse ownership composition represents a less effec-
tual corporate governance structure. Weisbach (1992) and Shivdasani (1993) argue that firms char-
acterised by weaker corporate governance structures are more likely to be disciplined via hostile 
takeover. Further, Maug (1998) suggests that the going-private transaction essentially constitutes a 
reunification of ownership and control. For instance, after a buy-out the post-transaction equity 
ownership resides in fewer hands. Investors will therefore have stronger incentives and more infor-
mation to invest actively in monitoring management. Renneboog and Simons (2005) support this 
argument, contending that the main source of wealth gains from the going-private transaction 
results from a reduction in agency costs caused by diffuse ownership concentration. This leads to 
our second hypothesis (stated in the alternate):
H2: Firms targeted by private equity have a less effectual ownership structure when compared 
with those of conventional corporate takeover targets.
3.3. Managerial power
The third dimension of a firm’s corporate governance structure we investigated is the extent of 
insider shareholdings in the target firm, defined as the fraction of fully paid, ordinary shares that 
are, at the time of the bid, owned by top management executives and/or a firm’s CEO. This focus 
encompasses the incentive component of corporate governance theory. In response to the agency 
problem, firms implement specific mechanisms which mitigate issues associated with the separa-
tion of ownership and control. One such mechanism is that of managerial ownership. By effec-
tively ‘pegging’ the individual wealth of the managerial team to the value of a firm, it is hypothesised 
that management is motivated to pursue Manne’s (1965) ‘shareholder wealth maximization strate-
gies’. The empirical literature outlines two complementary, incentive-based theories: Jensen and 
Meckling’s (1976) convergence-of-interest hypothesis and Morck et al.’s (1988) management 
entrenchment hypothesis. Each of these attempts to explain how the level of executive ownership 
can influence firm performance and hence, firm value.
According to Jensen and Meckling (1976), the agency costs associated with a deviation from 
firm value-maximisation effectively decline as inside ownership increases. Here, top management 
find themselves responsible for a larger component of the agency costs and are therefore less likely 
to squander corporate wealth (Morck et al., 1988). Jensen and Meckling (1976) go on to argue that 
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as managerial shareholdings increase, the interests of the decision makers start to converge with 
those of the equity holders. This realignment of interests mitigates agency costs and thus Jensen 
and Meckling’s (1976) convergence-of-interest hypothesis posits that the market value of a firm 
will increase as managerial ownership increases.
Using the convergence-of-interests hypothesis proposed by Jensen and Meckling (1976) as a 
starting point, a number of subsequent authors identified certain caveats that relate to the offsetting 
costs of significant managerial ownership (Fama and Jensen, 1983). For example, the extant litera-
ture suggests that even a manager with a relatively small ownership stake could still be coerced to 
pursue Manne’s (1965) ‘shareholder wealth maximisation strategies’ via market discipline. 
Specifically, the literature shows that the market for corporate control (Jensen and Ruback, 1983), 
the product market (Hart, 1983) and the managerial labour market (Fama, 1980) can each effec-
tively impede top management’s attempts to deploy corporate assets in ways which do not benefit 
shareholders. Alternatively, Khan et al. (2014) provide some support for Jensen and Meckling’s 
(1976) convergence-of-interest hypothesis, documenting a positive relation between managerial 
shareholdings and firm performance in a sample of large Australian firms, but only when manage-
rial ownership exceeded 20%–30%. Interestingly, for levels of managerial ownership below this 
threshold, they documented a negative relation, suggesting a curvilinear relation between manage-
rial ownership and firm performance overall.
In contrast, Morck et al. (1988) suggest that managers who control larger components of a 
firm’s outstanding equity can compile enough voting power and general influence to entrench 
themselves in the firm. They propose a non-linear model in which excessive ownership by top 
management leads to entrenchment and, further, that such entrenchment may afford management 
the luxury of indulging in non-value maximising strategies that benefit themselves rather than the 
firm’s owners. Thus the entrenchment hypothesis developed by Morck et al. (1988) predicts that 
the market value of the firm will decline as managerial ownership increases beyond a threshold 
value. Weston (1979) provides strong support for this argument, documenting that in his sample no 
firm where insiders collectively owned more than 30% of the outstanding equity had ever been 
acquired via hostile takeover.
Consistent with Morck et al. (1988), we contend that larger managerial ownership stakes are 
a less effectual corporate governance structure. Consistent with Shivdasani (1993), we posit 
that firms characterised by weaker corporate governance characteristics are more likely to be 
targeted and subsequently acquired via hostile takeover. Therefore, consistent with Morck’s 
et al. (1988) managerial entrenchment hypothesis, we propose as our third hypothesis (stated in 
the alternate):
H3: Firms targeted by private equity have greater managerial shareholdings, and hence less 
effectual managerial power, when compared with those of conventional takeover targets.
4. Econometric model and proxy selection
4.1. Econometric model
The focus of this study is on the role that the corporate governance structure of the target firm 
plays, if any, in private equity’s selection of a target. This notion has been formalised in the preced-
ing section through specific hypotheses relating to three fundamental dimensions of a firm’s cor-
porate governance structure. To test these hypotheses, we employ the following logistic regression 
model:
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In the context of this model, PRIVj is a categorical variable set equal to one if the bidder for 
target firm j is designated as private equity and zero if the bid represents a conventional takeover 
bid. We follow Chapple et al. (2010) by defining a private equity bid as one where the bidder is 
either a private equity firm or the bidding consortium involves a private equity firm. The three 
corporate governance dimensions under consideration are board structure (BoardStructure), own-
ership structure (OwnStructure), and managerial power (MgrPower). Finally, with reference to the 
extant literature, we identify four measures for inclusion in the vector of control variables 
(CONTROL). These control variables are discussed immediately below; and the way that we meas-
ure each of the corporate governance dimensions is discussed thereafter in a dedicated section. The 
various measures are summarised in Table 1.
The four control variables are free cash flow, size, growth and profitability. We include a free 
cash flow control variable, given the arguments of Jensen (1986) and Lehn and Poulsen (1989), 
and the findings of Chapple et al. (2010). Jensen argues that firms going private are characterised 
by relatively higher free cash flows. Equally, Lehn and Poulsen (1989) suggest that because firms 
going private will have substantial free cash flow, the going-private transaction essentially returns 
the excess funds to shareholders since their highly leveraged nature means that management is 
effectively committed to pay out the funds to cover debt repayments rather than wasting them on 
unprofitable projects (Jensen, 1986). This forces a realignment of interests between the firm’s own-
ers and managers and therefore mitigates agency costs. Consistent with these arguments, Chapple 
et al. document a positive association between the likelihood of a private equity bid and the target 
firm’s free cash flow. We measure free cash flow as the firm’s free cash flow scaled by total assets 
(FCF/TA), where FCF represents the cash flow in excess of that required to all projects that have 
a positive net present value (Weir and Wright, 2006).
Following Weir et al. (2006) and Chapple et al. (2010) who both document a positive associa-
tion between the likelihood of a private equity bidder and firm size, we also control for target firm 
size using the natural log of a target firm’s total assets (LnTA). In addition, we use the market-to-
book ratio (M/B) to control for target firm growth prospects. Here, Jensen (1986) and Lehn and 
Poulsen (1989) both argue that leveraged buyout candidates are typically characterised by lower 
growth profiles, a proposition that finds support in Shivdasani (1993) and Chapple et al. (2010). 
Finally, following Chapple et al. (2010), we control for target firm profitability, measuring profit-
ability as the firm’s return on equity (ROE).
4.2. Board structure measures
Consistent with the extant literature, to test H1 we consider five board-related variables: board size 
measured as the total number of directors (BOARDSIZE); the fraction of each board comprised of 
inside directors (BOARDINSIDE); and the number of audit committee (ACMEET), compensation 
committee (CCMEET), and board meetings (BOARDMEET) held each year.
To begin, Yermack (1996) verifies Jensen’s (1986) prediction of a negative correlation between 
firm value and board size. Here, two primary reasons promoted are the increased problems with 
communication and coordination as group size increases, and the decreased ability of the board to 
control management because of the ‘free-riding’ problem (Eisenberg et al., 1998). Based on the 
suggestion by Shivdasani (1993) and Weir et al. (2006) that firms characterised by less effectual 
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Table 1. Econometric model variable summary.
Theoretical construct Variables Definition Expected sign
Private equity bidder PRIV A dichotomous variable set to ‘1’ for private 
equity transactions and ‘0’ otherwise, where the 
benchmark (PRIV = 0) sample is the 182 target 
firms matched by year and four-digit GICS code.
 
Board structure:  
Board size BOARDSIZE A continuous variable which measures the 
number of directors serving on the target firm 
board
+
Board insiders BOARDINSIDE A continuous variable which measures the 
fraction of the target firm’s board which is 




ACMEET A continuous variable which measures the 
number of annual audit committee meetings 




CCMEET A continuous variable which measures the 
number of annual compensation committee 
meetings held by the target firm board
–
Board of director 
meetings
BOARDMEET A continuous variable which measures the 
number of board meetings held by the target 
firm
–
Ownership structure:  
Shareholder 
ownership
SHAREOWN A continuous variable which measures the 
fraction of outstanding shares held by the target 




BLOCKOWN A continuous variable which measures the 
fraction of the outstanding target firm shares 
owned by blockholder.
–
Managerial power:  
Inside chair DUALITY A dichotomous variable set to 1 when the 
target firm’s CEO also holds the position of 
chairperson of the board, and ‘0’ otherwise.
+
CEO ownership CEOOWN A dichotomous variable set equal to 1 if the 
proportion of the target firm’s outstanding 
shares held by the CEO or managing director 




COMPMIX A continuous variable which measures the 
fraction of total annual CEO compensation that 
is comprised of performance plans and annual 
bonus.
+
Control variables:  
Return on equity ROE A continuous variable measuring the target 
firm’s return on equity.
–
Natural log of total 
assets
LnTA A continuous variable measuring the natural log 
of the target firm’s total assets.
+
Market-to-Book ratio M/B A continuous variable measuring the target 
firm’s market value scaled by book value.
–
Free cash flows scaled 
by total assets
FCF/TA A continuous variable measuring the target 
firm’s free cash flows scaled by total assets.
+
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corporate governance structures are more likely to attract hostile takeover bids, we expect private 
equity partnerships to target firms with larger boards.
Furthermore, it has been argued that independent directors are better monitors of managers 
because of the increased concern of such directors about their reputation in the directorship 
market (Fama and Jensen, 1983). The board is presumed to become less independent as the 
number of inside directors increases proportionately. A less independent board is more likely 
to be characterised by a misalignment of interests between the firms’ owners and managers 
and thereby represents a weaker corporate governance structure. Accordingly, consistent with 
Shivdasani (1993), we contend that firms characterised by a larger proportion of inside direc-
tors are more likely to attract hostile bids and therefore, attract the attention of private equity 
partnerships.
The final set of measures captures board activity. Here, the empirical literature contends that the 
number of times board committees meet per year is positively related to the effectiveness of a 
board’s monitoring function. Thus we expect that a smaller number of meetings reflects a weaker 
corporate governance structure and therefore there is a greater likelihood of attracting hostile take-
over bids (Shivdasani, 1993). Because board committees meet separately from the full board and 
comprise subsets of the board members with specific knowledge on narrowly defined functions 
(Klein, 1998), we considered each of the number of audit committee, compensation committee, 
and full board meetings in the year prior to the takeover bid.
4.3. Shareholder ownership measures
To test hypothesis H2, we measured the ownership concentration of target firms in two comparable 
ways: the fraction of outstanding shares held by the firm’s top 20 shareholders (SHAREOWN) and 
the fraction of outstanding shares held by the firm’s blockholders (BLOCKOWN).9 These measures 
have been used in previous going-private research (Chapple et al., 2010), as well as in the broader 
corporate governance literature (Larcker et al., 2007). It is argued here that firms characterised by 
a more diffuse ownership structure inherently suffer a greater free-rider problem. As such, we 
interpret lower ownership concentration as indicative of a weaker external corporate governance 
structure and as a result more likely to attract hostile bids (Shivdasani, 1993; Weisbach, 1992) Thus 
we predict that private equity partnerships will be attracted to firms characterised by more diffuse 
ownership structures.
4.4. Managerial power measures
The final dimension of governance that we considered relates to the power of management –  
specifically, the firm’s CEO. Here, we employ three alternative measures to investigate H3: an 
indicator variable which identifies firms which have a CEO who also acts as chairman of the board 
(DUALITY); an indicator variable that identifies high proportionate share ownership by the firm’s 
CEO or Managing Director (CEOOWN); and the fraction of total annual CEO remuneration com-
prised of annual bonuses and performance plans (COMPMIX).
CEO duality (DUALITY) refers to the circumstance wherein the CEO simultaneously also 
serves as the chairman of the board of directors (Kini et al., 1995). We use this measure to gauge 
the CEO’s power in relation to the board of directors, arguing that ‘duality’ weakens the board’s 
monitoring role and compromises its independence. For this reason, CEO duality is often associ-
ated with weaker corporate governance (Christensen et al., 2014) and thus the firm more likely to 
attract a hostile bid (Shivdasani, 1993). We therefore argue that private equity is more likely to 
target firms where the CEO also serves as chairman of the board.
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To measure the second indicator variable, CEOOWN, we calculated CEO ownership as the 
proportion of the firm’s shares held by the CEO or Managing Director, and then set CEOOWN 
equal to one for firms with values above the median. Jensen and Meckling (1976) argued that as 
managerial ownership initially increases, the interests of the firm’s decision makers begin to con-
verge with the interests of the firm’s equity holders. However, should insider shareholdings increase 
beyond a certain level, Morck et al. (1988) contend that the agency problem will once again arise. 
As discussed, they proposed a non-linear model in which excessive ownership above a threshold 
level leads to entrenchment of top management. We argue that excessively large managerial own-
ership stakes are indicative of a less effectual corporate governance structure and thus the firm is 
more likely to be targeted by hostile takeover bids (Shivdasani, 1993; Weir et al., 2006). Accordingly, 
we expect private equity target firms to be characterised by relatively higher levels of managerial/
CEO shareholdings. Finally, we propose a relatively naïve measure of managerial power based 
upon the annual compensation mix of a firm’s CEO (COMPMIX). We calculated COMPMIX as the 
fraction of total annual CEO compensation that comprises performance plans and annual bonuses.
5. Sample data and benchmarking procedure
5.1. Sample data
In order to conduct our experiment, we required both a sample of private equity bids and a control 
(benchmark) sample comprising corporate takeover bids. As noted at the outset, our focus is on the 
Australian experience; further, given the unprecedented levels of activity within the global private 
equity investment sector throughout the first decade of the 2000’s, the study period we adopted was 
1 January 2001 to 30 June 2010.10 Given this choice of experimental setting, we identified both 
samples from the Connect 4 ‘Takeovers’ database. Because our focus was on target firm corporate 
governance attributes, we considered all bids irrespective of outcome (successful, current, with-
drawn, or unsuccessful), as well as both schemes of arrangement (mergers) and acquisitions.
A search of the Connect 4 database revealed a preliminary sample of 882 takeover bids aimed 
at ASX listed firms and denominated in Australian dollars over the study period. Of these, 50 were 
private equity bids, defined as those in which the bidder was either a private equity firm or the bid-
ding consortium involved a private equity firm (Chapple et al., 2010), and the remaining 832 were 
conventional corporate takeover bids. In this sample, seven of the private equity target firms and 
93 of the corporate takeover target firms were the subject of multiple takeover bids. In order to 
ensure that these target firms were not over-represented, we retained only the first bid for each.11 
Finally, we sourced the accounting and governance measures required in the econometric model 
– equation (1) – from the AspectHuntley’s FinAnalysis database. Because all the target firms were 
covered in the FinAnalysis database, the final samples consisted of 43 unique private equity bid 
target firms and 739 unique corporate takeover bid target firms.
Table 2 presents a frequency distribution for the sample bids by year (Panel A) and industry 
(two-digit GICS code) (Panel B). As revealed in the first column of Panel A and consistent with the 
reported figures in the RBAs’ March 2007 Financial Stability Review, a majority of the sample 
private equity bids occurred during the window 2006 – 2008, with 8 bids in 2006, 11 bids in 2007 
and 10 bids in 2008. In contrast, as revealed in the second column, the distribution for the number 
of corporate takeover bids is relatively more uniform over the study period, although there were 
slightly more bids over the period 2006–2009. The relative importance of private equity within the 
market for corporate control is confirmed in the third column of Panel A, which shows the number 
of private equity bids as a proportion of total bids by year. Here, the proportion ranges from 0% in 
2002 (with no private equity bids) to 13.2% in 2008 (10 of the 76 bids were private equity bids). 
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Table 2. Frequency distribution by year and industry for samples of 43 private equity and 739 corporate 
takeover bids over the period 2001–2010.















2001 1 73 0.014 12 0.083
2002 0 57 0.000 0 0.000
2003 3 73 0.039 18 0.167
2004 2 72 0.027 5 0.400
2005 2 59 0.033 18 0.111
2006 8 105 0.071 41 0.195
2007 11 103 0.096 35 0.314
2008 10 66 0.132 31 0.323
2009 4 100 0.038 20 0.200
2010 2 31 0.061 2 1.000
Total 43 739 0.055 182 0.236
Panel B: Frequency distribution by industry





Year and industry match
Energy 10 3 (0.070) 73 (0.099) 23 (0.126)
Materials 15 8 (0.186) 213 (0.288) 96 (0.527)
Industrials 20 5 (0.116) 74 (0.100) 9 (0.049)
Consumer 
discretionary
25 12 (0.279) 94 (0.127) 19 (0.104)
Consumer staples 30 1 (0.023) 47 (0.064) 0 (0.000)
Health care 35 2 (0.047) 47 (0.064) 5 (0.027)
Financials 40 6 (0.140) 117 (0.158) 14 (0.077)
Information 
technology
45 5 (0.116) 44 (0.060) 16 (0.088)
Telecommunication 
services
50 0 (0.000) 15 (0.020) 0 (0.000)
Utilities 55 1 (0.023) 15 (0.020) 0 (0.000)
Total 43 (1.000) 739 (1.000) 182 (1.000)
Private equity bids also played a much more important role in the market for corporate control in 
2006 (7.1%) and 2007 (9.6%) relative to the other years within the study period.
The first column of Panel B reveals that all GICS sectors except telecommunications are repre-
sented in the private equity bid sample.12 However, the majority of the private equity bids are for 
targets in three specific sectors: ‘consumer discretionary’ (27.9%), ‘materials’ (18.6%) and ‘finan-
cials’ (14.0%). In contrast, the second column reveals that the corporate takeover bids target firms 
somewhat more uniformly across all ten sectors, although the ‘materials’ sector is the most fre-
quently represented (28.8%). Overall, while a comparison of the respective industry profiles 
reveals a number of differences, two perhaps worthy of note are the relatively lower attention paid 
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by private equity to firms in the ‘materials’ sector (18.6% versus 28.8%) and the relatively greater 
attention paid to firms in the ‘consumer discretionary’ sector (27.9% versus 12.7%). Here, as pos-
ited by Chapple et al. (2010), there are two possible reasons why private equity may shy away from 
the ‘materials’ sector and notably the ‘metals and mining group’: first, the often unpredictable 
outcomes of these ventures; and, second, their dependence on equity funding. Thus, the apparent 
private equity ‘overweighting’ of the ‘consumer discretionary’ sector may simply reflect an avoid-
ance of targets in the ‘materials’ sector.
5.2. Benchmarking strategy
Importantly, irrespective of the underlying source, Table 2 clearly reveals that the distribution of 
the private equity bids differs in important ways across time and industry relative to the corporate 
takeover bids.13 Given these differences, it is unlikely that the sample of 739 corporate takeover 
target firms represents an appropriate benchmark sample against which to gauge the corporate 
governance attributes of the private equity bid target firms. As a final step we followed the approach 
adopted by Chapple et al. (2010) for developing a benchmark (control) sample against which to 
gauge the corporate governance attributes of the private equity bid target firms.
Specifically, we adopted a benchmarking strategy that pitches private equity target firm charac-
teristics against corporate takeover target firm attributes, matched by year and four-digit GICS 
code. Since typically there is more than one eligible corporate match, to eliminate the possibility 
for selection bias we pooled the private equity and corporate takeover firms within industry and 
year, and then ranked each measure in ascending order. Finally, we normalised the measures by 
converting the ranks to percentile ranks to adjust for differing sample sizes within each industry-
year group. Our analyses were then based on these percentile rank data.14
This benchmarking strategy resulted in an industry–year matched corporate takeover sample of 
182 bids. The last two columns of Panel A of Table 2 show the distribution of these 182 matched 
bids and corresponding private equity proportions. Also, the last column of Panel B of Table 2 
presents the industry distribution of matched bids. Here, while the distributions of the private 
equity bids across both year and industry more closely align with those of the industry-year 
matched benchmark sample than with those of the broader sample of corporate takeovers, the 
overlay is imperfect, given the differing number of corporate bids within each industry–year group.
5.3. Descriptive statistics
Table 3 presents target firm descriptive statistics from the reporting period most immediately 
preceding the takeover offer. The dimensions we considered were firm size (market capitalisa-
tion, total assets, and total revenue), profitability (ROA and ROE), free cash flow, growth 
(market-to-book) and efficiency (asset turnover). The first four dimensions represent the control 
variables included in our econometric model – equation (1) – given arguments and evidence that 
suggest likely differences along these dimensions between the private equity and corporate take-
over bid target firms. The first set of columns reports the statistics based on the raw data; the 
second set reports statistics based on the percentile rank data. The figures presented are those for 
the private equity target firms, the matched corporate takeover target firms, and p-values for the 
differences in mean and median values. Given distributional properties, we emphasise median 
tests for the raw data.
As expected, the reported statistics suggest that the private equity target firms are indeed larger, 
more profitable, have higher free cash flow and are more efficient. Conversely, there is no evidence 
of a difference in terms of the market-to-book ratio. In greater detail, the raw median value and the 
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Table 3. Descriptive statistics for samples of private equity and matched corporate target firms.
Variables Raw data Percentile rank data







Market capitalisation  
Mean AU$1044.769 AU$425.068 0.019 0.659 0.477 <0.001
Median AU$218.688 AU$83.317 0.012 0.750 0.500 <0.001
SD AU$2774.083 AU$1071.614 0.366 0.329  
Quartile 1 AU$50.796 AU$23.819 0.384 0.200  
Quartile 3 AU$799.780 AU$332.811 1.000 0.750  
Total assets  
Mean AU$1318.527 AU$409.332 <0.001 0.639 0.479 <0.001
Median AU$270.852 AU$67.840 <0.001 0.750 0.500 <0.001
SD AU$3309.063 AU$1028.613 0.375 0.329  
Quartile 1 AU$86.461 AU$21.298 0.320 0.212  
Quartile 3 AU$714.860 AU$301.722 1.000 0.750  
Total revenue  
Mean AU$1584.559 AU$241.008 <0.001 0.675 0.462 <0.001
Median AU$205.600 AU$28.325 <0.001 0.857 0.466 <0.001
SD AU$5651.865 AU$633.519 0.368 0.332  
Quartile 1 AU$51.587 AU$1.145 0.447 0.166  
Quartile 3 AU$541.442 AU$168.051 1.000 0.750  
Free cash flow  
Mean AU$89.575 AU$13.706 0.018 0.608 0.488 0.040
Median AU$8.260 – AU$1.368 0.015 0.705 0.500 0.035
SD AU$348.441 AU$124.139 0.406 0.327  
Quartile 1 – AU$6.345 – AU$8.535 0.256 0.212  
Quartile 3 AU$47.560 AU$10.530 1.000 0.750  
Return on assets  
Mean −0.251% −0.128% 0.378 0.573 0.497 0.193
Median 0.049% 0.009% 0.046 0.625 0.500 0.193
SD 1.569% 0.504% 0.351 0.341  
Quartile 1 −0.009% −0.126% 0.272 0.200  
Quartile 3 0.088% 0.071% 0.934 0.784  
Return on equity  
Mean −0.070% −0.106% 0.887 0.667 0.473 <0.001
Median 0.115% 0.007% <0.001 0.700 0.472 <0.001
SD 1.551% 1.485% 0.330 0.336  
Quartile 1 0.034% –0.174% 0.500 0.174  
Quartile 3 0.203% 0.134% 1.000 0.750  
Asset turnover  
Mean 1.204 0.677 <0.001 0.580 0.484 0.106
Median 0.711 0.409 0.011 0.625 0.500 0.095
Std. Dev. 1.501 0.846 0.394 0.336  
Quartile 1 0.301 0.018 0.208 0.202  
Quartile 3 1.525 1.019 1.000 0.750  
Market-to-book  
Mean 2.367 2.858 0.378 0.553 0.495 0.323
Median 2.000 1.920 0.715 0.565 0.500 0.327
SD 1.823 3.525 0.366 0.339  
Quartile 1 1.275 1.020 0.333 0.200  
Quartile 3 3.130 3.613 0.950 0.795  
The samples are 43 private equity bids and 182 corporate bids matched by year and industry. The measures presented are mean and me-
dian values for both the raw and percentile rank data, and two-tailed p-values for tests of differences. Percentile ranks were determined 
by pooling the private and matched corporate bids, ranking each measure within year and industry, and then converting the ranks to 
percentiles.
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percentile mean and median values for all three size measures are significantly higher for the pri-
vate equity sample at approximately the 1% level or better. For free cash flow, consistent with 
Chapple et al. (2010), mean and median values of both the raw and percentile rank measures are 
significantly higher for the private equity sample at the 5% level. Similarly, the raw median value 
and the percentile mean and median values of ROE are also significantly higher for the private 
equity sample, although only the median measure of ROA is statistically higher. While the percen-
tile rank values are also numerically higher, the differences are not statistically significant. 
Furthermore, the raw mean and median asset turnover ratios are significantly higher for the private 
equity sample at approximately the 1% level, although the differences in percentile rank values are 
only weakly so. Finally, while the mean and median values of both the raw and percentile rank 
market-to-book ratios are higher for the private equity target firms, the differences are not statisti-
cally significant at conventional levels.
Overall the descriptive statistics are consistent with the notion that private equity is searching 
for larger, more profitable and more efficient Australian target firms which possess higher free cash 
flows. The findings on the size measures are consistent with the RBA contention that the recent 
increase in the overall value of Australian leveraged buyout activity is accounted for by a sharp rise 
in the average size of the going-private transaction, as opposed to a rise in the number of deals.1 
Interestingly, the finding for profitability is opposite that expected on the basis of Manne’s (1965) 
inefficient management hypothesis which posits that hostile takeovers are a device for disciplining 
top management of poorly performing firms. It is, however, consistent with Chapple et al. (2010) 
who documented superior profitability for their sample of private equity targets.15
Finally, Table 4 presents a pair-wise correlation matrix for the measures contained in our econo-
metric model, equation (1). The table presents bivariate Spearman (non-parametric) correlations 
below the diagonal and Pearson parametric correlations above the diagonal. As shown, the largest 
correlation is 0.523 within the Pearson matrix and 0.506 within the Spearman matrix, each between 
the number of audit committee and compensation committee meetings. As such, the likelihood is 
of a limited threat of multicollinearity (Gujarati, 1995).16
6. Empirical results
6.1. Univariate results
Table 5 presents mean and median values for the target firm governance measures we consider 
within this study. As above, the first set of columns report values based on the raw data and the 
second set of columns report values based on the percentile rank data. For each, the figures pre-
sented are those for the 43 private equity target firms, the 182 matched corporate takeover target 
firms, and p-values for the differences in mean and median values between the two samples. 
Given distributional properties, we focus our discussion on the values derived from the percen-
tile rank data. In most instances, the raw data yield identical interpretations. In brief, the results 
of these univariate tests provide mixed support for H1, provide no support for H2, and modest 
support for H3.
Beginning with the board structure variables identified to test H1, as predicted we find that the 
boards of the private equity target firms are significantly larger (BOARDSIZE) at the 1% level 
based on both mean and median values. Equally, and also as predicted, while the proportion of 
executive board members (BOARDINSIDE) is higher for the private equity target firms, neither the 
difference in mean nor median values is significant at conventional levels. Finally, and contrary to 
predictions, the mean and median values for each of the three board activity measures, board meet-
ings (BOARDMEET), audit committee meetings (ACMEET) and compensation committee 
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Table 5. Governance measure descriptive statistics for samples of private equity and matched corporate 
target firms.










Panel A: Board Structure Measures (H1)
BOARDSIZE Mean 6.395 5.352 <0.001 0.640 0.451 <0.001
 Median 6.000 5.000 <0.001 0.833 0.500 <0.001
BOARDINSIDE Mean 0.296 0.293 0.910 0.555 0.495 0.321
 Median 0.250 0.250 0.900 0.500 0.500 0.326
ACMEET Mean 4.023 2.637 <0.001 0.635 0.402 <0.001
 Median 4.000 2.000 <0.001 0.667 0.367 <0.001
CCMEET Mean 2.442 1.401 <0.001 0.559 0.317 <0.001
 Median 2.000 1.000 <0.001 0.667 0.183 <0.001
BOARDMEET Mean 13.581 11.692 0.039 0.587 0.489 0.087
 Median 12.000 11.000 0.056 0.667 0.500 0.111
Panel B: Shareholder ownership composition measures (H2)
BLOCKOWN Mean 0.465 0.476 0.753 0.521 0.505 0.795
 Median 0.494 0.459 0.999 0.538 0.500 0.782
SHAREOWN Mean 0.699 0.702 0.910 0.510 0.507 0.958
 Median 0.748 0.701 0.888 0.500 0.500 0.929
Panel C: Managerial power measures (H3)
CEOOWN Mean 0.042 0.037 0.694 0.576 0.464 0.064
 Median 0.005 0.005 0.340 0.667 0.470 0.071
DUALITY Mean 0.093 0.055 0.355 0.093 0.055 0.355
 Median 0.000 0.000 0.699 0.000 0.000 0.699
COMPMIX Mean 0.280 0.255 0.584 0.519 0.416 0.105
 Median 0.342 0.127 0.346 0.500 0.333 0.150
The samples are 43 private equity bids and 182 corporate bids matched by year and industry. The measures presented 
are mean and median values for both the raw and percentile rank data, and two-tailed p-values for tests of differences. 
Percentile ranks were determined by pooling the private and matched corporate bids, ranking each measure within year 
and industry, and then converting the ranks to percentiles.
All variables are defined in Table 1.
meetings (CCMEET) are all higher for the private equity target firm sample. Here, one possible 
interpretation is that target boards play more of a reactive role than a proactive role in monitoring 
managers, consistent with Vafeas’ (1999) finding of a negative relation between board meeting 
frequency and firm value.
Turning to the ownership structure measures identified to test H2, the results reveal little differ-
ence between the extent of either block ownership (BLOCKOWN) or top 20 shareholdings 
(SHAREOWN). Tests for differences in mean and median values of these measures are insignifi-
cant at conventional levels. Overall, therefore, these tests suggest similar ownership structures for 
the samples of private equity target firms and matched corporate takeover target firms.
Finally, turning to the identified measures of managerial power (H3), differences in mean and 
median values for all three measures are in the predicted direction, although only the difference in 
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the CEO ownership measure (CEOOWN) is statistically significant (at the 10% level).17 Neither 
the differences in mean or median values of DUALITY and COMPMIX are significant at conven-
tional levels.
To summarise: our univariate results suggest that, relative to the benchmark industry–year 
matched sample, private equity target firms are characterised by larger boards, greater board activ-
ity, a higher level of inside ownership, and greater CEO ownership. Thus, on balance, relative to 
expectations, these results provide at best mixed support for the overarching argument that private 
equity targets firms with less effectual corporate governance structures. In the next section, we turn 
to the results from the multivariate analyses.
6.2. Multivariate results
Table 6 reports the findings for the logistic regression model – equation (1) – based on the per-
centile ranked data with White’s (1980) and Huber’s (1967) robust standard errors. Models (1), 
(2) and (3) individually introduce the alternative sets of governance measures, board structure 
(H1), ownership composition (H2), and managerial power (H3), respectively, into the model. 
Model (4) then incorporates all three sets of governance measures. All models include the four 
control variables. For these control variables, the coefficient on ROE is consistently positive 
and significant at the 1% level, the coefficients on both FCF/TA and M/B are uniformly insig-
nificant at conventional levels, and the coefficients on lnTA are weakly significant in two of the 
four models.
As revealed by the model χ2 statistics and McFadden’s R2s, all models have reasonable 
explanatory power, although Model (1), with only the board structure measures, appears to 
dominate Models (2) and (3) with only the shareholder ownership and managerial power meas-
ures, respectively. Further, the results are generally consistent with those from the univariate 
analyses. From a global perspective, as reported at the bottom of Table 6, the results for the 
Wald tests of joint significance reveal support for H1 (board structure) and to a lesser extent H3 
(managerial power), but no support for H2 (ownership composition). Given the consistent mes-
sage arising from the various models, we restrict our discussions to the composite model, Model 
(4). Here, the χ2 statistic for the joint significance of the five board structure measures is 18.024, 
significant at the 1% level, while the χ2 statistic for the joint significance of the three manage-
rial power measures is 4.402, significant at the 5% level. Alternatively, the χ2 statistic for the 
joint significance of the two shareholder ownership composition measures at 0.794 is insignifi-
cant at conventional levels.
Turning to results for the individual measures, for H1 we find the coefficients on BOARDSIZE 
and BOARDINSIDE to be positive as expected and significant. For Model (4), their coefficients are 
0.995 and 1.656, respectively, the former significant at the 10% level and the latter at the 1% level. 
However, the coefficient on BOARDMEET while negative as predicted is insignificant. The coef-
ficients on ACMEET and CCMEET are both positive in contrast with predictions and weakly sig-
nificant. With regard to H2, consistent with the χ2-statistic for the test of joint significance, the 
coefficients on both SHAREOWN and BLOCKOWN are insignificant at conventional levels. Lastly, 
with regard to H3, the coefficients on all three measures are positive as predicted, although only the 
coefficients on CEOOWN and DUALITY are significant. Within Model (4), their coefficients are 
0.992 and 1.541, both significant at the 5% level. Alternatively, the coefficient on COMPMIX at 
0.106 is insignificant at conventional levels.
To summarise: the results appear to support the assertions that private equity partnerships seek 
target firms with less effectual board structures (H1) and managerial power (H3), consistent with 
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Table 6. Logistic regression model results relating probability of a private equity bid to target firm 
governance structure measures.
Variable Sign Model (1) Model (2) Model (3) Model (4)
BOARDSIZE + 0.849* 0.995*
 (0.094) (0.072)
BOARDINSIDE + 1.722*** 1.656***
 (0.004) (0.009)
ACMEET – 1.210* 1.379*
 (0.090) (0.072)
CCMEET – 1.252** 1.314*
 (0.026) (0.060)
BOARDMEET – −0.441 −0.458
 (0.494) (0.484)
SHAREOWN – −0.629 −0.570
 (−0.514) (0.351)
BLOCKOWN – 0.351 0.118
 (0.726) (0.845)
CEOOWN + 1.130** 0.992**
 (0.031) (0.040)
DUALITY + 0.835** 1.541**
 (0.021) (0.036)
COMPMIX + 0.256 0.106
 (0.608) (0.854)
ROE 1.799*** 1.660*** 1.789*** 2.141***
 (0.007) (0.009) (0.006) (0.002)
FCF/TA −0.362 −0.346 −0.339 −0.400
 (0.544) (0.562) (0.567) (0.514)
LnTA −0.288 1.060* 1.134* −0.315
 (0.673) (0.062) (0.057) (0.665)
M/B 0.039 0.198 0.085 0.115
 (0.947) (0.707) (0.876) (0.850)
intercept −4.385*** −2.766*** −3.728*** −4.753***
 (<0.001) (<0.001) (<0.001) (<0.001)
Chi-square (χ2) 34.778*** 16.008*** 22.738*** 41.339***
Nagelkerke R2 0.230 0.110 0.154 0.269
Wald test (F-statistic) for 
joint significance of
 
BoardStructure, χ2 (5) 21.495*** 18.024***  
Ownership Structure, 
χ2 (2)
1.092 0.794  
Managerial Power, χ2 (3) 8.807** 4.402**  
The samples are 43 private equity bids and 182 corporate bids matched by year and industry. All variables are defined in 
Table 1. The analyses are based on equation (1) using percentile rank measures, determined by pooling the private and 
matched corporate bids, ranking each measure within year and industry, and then converting the ranks to percentiles.
***, **, **significant at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively; two –tailed p-values presented in parentheses.
the disciplinary nature of private equity takeovers. Alternatively, there appears to be no support for 
the assertion that they seek target firms with less effectual ownership structures.
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6.3. Additional considerations
First, we will address concerns regarding attenuation bias, in which the use of multiple proxies to 
measure one construct within a single regression model may bias the coefficient estimates towards 
zero (Lubotsky and Wittenberg, 2006). Second, as documented in Table 2, the distribution of sam-
ple private equity bids is not uniform across the study period. To provide some assurance that our 
results are not sensitive to the choice of study period, we partitioned our data into the two sub-
periods, 2001–2007 and 2008–2010, and then repeated our regression analysis. As indicated in the 
discussion below, we found our results and conclusions to be unaffected by these two additional 
considerations.
In greater detail, regarding attenuation bias, the pair-wise correlations reported in Table 4 sug-
gest that it could be a material concern for the two ownership composition measures (the Pearson 
correlation between SHAREOWN and BLOCKOWN is 0.841) and a possible concern for the five 
board structure measures (three of the correlations exceed 0.4), but is unlikely to be a concern for 
the managerial power measures (none of the correlations exceed 0.2). As such, we undertook factor 
analysis to construct composite measures for each of the governance categories and the re-run 
equation (1) based on the rank measures of these underlying factor scores. Here, principal compo-
nents analysis (PCA) revealed one common factor for each of the ownership composition and 
managerial power categories, respectively, but three factors underlying the board structure meas-
ures, with BOARDSIZE and BOARDINSIDE identified as unique factors and a common factor 
capturing the board activity measures (ACMEET, CCMEET, and BOARDMEET).
The results (not tabulated) uniformly support the conclusions based on the primary analyses 
reported in Table 6. For the composite model which includes all governance factors and the control 
variables, the coefficients on BOARDSIZE (1.373, p = 0.059) and BOARDINSIDE (1.204, p = 
0.045) remain positive and significant, while the coefficient on the board activity factor measure is 
insignificant at conventional levels (−0.301, p = 0.213). Further, the coefficient on the ownership 
composition factor measure remains insignificant (−0.088, p = 0.625). Finally, the coefficient on 
the managerial power factor is positive as expected and remains weakly significant at the 10% 
level (0.264, p = 0.070). Thus, results based on the ranked factor scores suggest that concerns 
regarding ‘attenuation bias’ are not driving either our results or conclusions.
Second, results (not tabulated) for equation (1) run separately on the two sub-periods, 2001–
2007 and 2008–2010, are, with two exceptions, consistent with those based on the complete 
study period reported in Table 6. Of initial note, the coefficient estimates for both sub-periods 
are of similar magnitude across all variables (governance and control). Further, in terms of 
significance, for the board structure measures, the coefficient on BOARDINSIDE remains posi-
tive and significant in both sub-periods, the coefficient on BOARDMEET remains negative as 
predicted and insignificant, and the coefficients on ACMEET and CCMEET remain positive in 
contrast with predictions. For the ownership composition measures, all coefficient estimates 
are again insignificant at conventional levels. Finally, for the managerial power measures, the 
coefficient on DUALITY remains positive and significant and the coefficient on COMPMIX 
insignificant. The only exceptions relate to the coefficients on BOARDSIZE and CEOOWN 
which, although having the same sign, are found to be insignificant in the later time period. 
Here, however, a potential mitigating factor might be the fact that while the pooled analysis was 
conducted on the basis of a sample of 43 private equity bids and 182 corporate bids, and the 
2001–2007 analysis on a sample of 27 private equity and 129 corporate bids, the analysis for 
the sub-period 2008–2010 was based on a much smaller sample of only 16 private equity bids 
and 53 corporate bids. Thus, overall, our results and conclusions do not appear to be sensitive 
to the choice of study period.18
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7. Summary and conclusion
This study investigated whether firms targeted by private equity partnerships have less effectual 
corporate governance structures when compared with those of conventional corporate targets. 
Hitherto, no formal research had been conducted seeking to describe the relationship between 
Australian private equity transactions and target firm corporate governance structures. Thus, the 
innovation of this study lies in the unexplored relationship between the disciplinary theory of 
takeovers and the Australian private equity investment sector. By investigating this relationship, 
this study provides insights into the determinants of private equity target firms, fills a gap in the 
empirical mergers and acquisition literature and presents market commentators with a more 
informative understanding of the Australian private equity investment sector.
We tested our expectations using a sample of 43 publicly listed private equity target firms and a 
benchmark control sample of 182 conventional corporate targets, matched by year and industry, for 
the period 2001–2010. Preliminary descriptive statistics indicate that, relative to other corporate 
targets, target firms that attract private equity attention are typically larger, more profitable, more 
efficient in terms of asset turnover and possess a comparatively greater amount of free cash flow.
Our univariate analysis indicates that, relative to our benchmark sample of corporate takeover 
targets, private equity targets have larger boards and a greater number of audit committee, compensa-
tion committee and board meetings. Further, they are characterised by a higher level of insider owner-
ship. The multivariate analysis indicates that private equity targets are more likely to have boards 
which perform a less effectual monitoring role and top management and which is more likely to be 
entrenched in the firm. in particular, we find that both the size of the board and the number of board 
insiders are positively related to likelihood of a private equity takeover bid. Further, we find a positive 
relationship between CEO shareholdings and the probability of a private equity takeover offer.
Considering the significance, materiality and interest in the Australian private equity investment 
sector, the results of this study can be of value to practitioners, professionals, regulators and aca-
demia in terms of providing an improved understanding of the determinants of Australian private 
equity takeover bids.
Equally, given its exploratory nature and the uniqueness of its hand collected data set, we 
acknowledge a number of caveats. As the growth in the Australian private equity investment sector 
is a somewhat recent phenomenon, our sample of Australian private equity targets is relatively 
limited. Further, due to the industry–year matched nature of our corporate benchmark sample, our 
total sample is ultimately limited by the number of private equity target firms. Although the addi-
tion of further private equity targets to our sample would be advantageous, in the sense that they 
would enhance the credibility and validity of this study by further mitigating the potential for 
biased results, we are confident that our narrowly defined interpretation of the term private equity 
renders our sample representative of the Australian going-private universe. A second limitation of 
this study relates to the data collection process and the tedious task of hand collecting corporate 
governance variables from the last available, pre-bid annual reports. This collection procedure 
ultimately constrained the breadth of our analysis of the Australian private equity investment sec-
tor. However, despite such a constraint, it is our contention that the important encompassing and 
reliable governance indicators were collected and employed within this analysis.
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Notes
 1. Reserve Bank of Australia, Financial Stability Review, March 2007, viewed 15 May 2010. http://www.
rba.gov.au/publications/fsr/2007/mar/html/private-equity-aus.html
 2. MacArthur, Varma and Henderson, Australian Financial Review, For brave firms, this 
may be a vintage year, viewed 18 October 2010. http://www.afr.com/p/markets/dealbook/
for_brave_firms_this_may_be_vintage_iKrheLSsMtbQcaueJddS4J?hlml
 3. Morrissey, J., October 15 2010, Private Equity Deals: Poised for a Comeback, Time, viewed 15 October 
2010. http://www.time.com/time/business/article/0,8599,2025884,00.html
 4. In the current study, our interest is in the question of whether private equity targets firms with less 
effectual governance structures (inclusive of board structures) than those firms targeted in conventional 
corporate takeovers. Fundamental to this question, and relevant not only to private equity takeover tar-
get firms but to the broader universe of firms, is the question of why some firms exhibit or choose less 
effectual governance (board) structures than to others. Clearly, such a decision is likely to be relatively 
complex, incorporating the interplay of factors captured under the various governance dimensions (inter-
nal versus external governance), in addition to other firm characteristics and external factors. Given its 
inherent interest and broader applicability, we leave this question for future research.
 5. OECD: The Private Equity Boom: Causes and Policy Issues, viewed 2 July 2010. http://www.oecd/
dataoecd/36/59/40973739.pdf
 6. Reserve Bank of Australia, Financial Stability Review, March 2007, viewed 15 May 2010. http://www.
rba.gov.au/publications/fsr/2007/mar/html/private-equity-aus.html
 7. AVCAL, Private equity in Australia, Submission to Senate Standing Committee on Economics, May 
2007, viewed 24 June. http://www.avcal.com.au/sites/default/files/uploads/news/AVCAL_Submission 
toSenate_FINAL_Edited_0.pdf
 8. ACSI, Public companies being taken private: a research report into private equity, Melbourne Centre 
of Financial Studies, August 2009, viewed August 2010. http://www.melbournecentre.com.au/files/
Private%20Equity%20Research%202009%20FINAL.pdf
 9. A blockholder is defined as a shareholder holding five per cent or above of the company’s shares. 
This definition is commonly used in Australia given a substantial holding is defined as five per cent or 
more of the total number of votes attached to voting shares in the body, and under section 671B of the 
Corporations Act a person with a substantial holding must disclose the information to the company.
10. This period encapsulates the majority of Australian private equity activity since inception in 1987 
(CHAMP Private Equity, Pioneering History, viewed 15 May 2010. http://www.champequity.com.au/
pioneering-history).
11. Sensitivity analyses confirm that results and conclusion are not sensitive to the inclusion or exclusion of 
these multiple observations. In several instances, firms were the target of both a corporate takeover bid 
and a private equity bid. For example, on 19 October 2005, Citect Corporation Ltd (CTL) attracted an 
ultimately unsuccessful corporate takeover bid; subsequently, on 6 January 2006, it became the subject 
of a private equity bid. Here also, results are robust to the inclusion or exclusion of these observations.
12. The absence of private equity activity in the telecommunications sector appears to reflect a norm in the 
Australian takeover market, a notion supported by the fact that only 2% of the corporate takeover bid 
sample involved a telecommunications target.
13. These differences are similar to those observed by Chapple et al. (2010) for their sample of Australian 
bids from 2001–2007.
14. The percentile ranks within each industry–year group are calculated as: percentile rank = (rank – 1)/
(#firms – 1).
15. Agrawal and Walkling (1994) find no evidence of pre-acquisition underperformance for takeovers where 
disciplining the managers is the likely motive and thereby conclude that hostile bids are not necessarily 
directed at poorly performing firms.
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16. Untabulated variance inflation factors (VIF) support the view that multicollinearity is not a threat.
17. One possible alternative explanation for these results is that higher levels of CEO shareholdings are a 
direct result of the small, ‘start-up’ nature of private equity target firms. However, the summary statistics 
reported in Table 3 which suggest that private equity target firms are larger indicate that this explanation 
is unlikely. In fact, our sample of private equity takeover targets encompasses some of Australia’s largest 
companies by market capitalisation, including Coles Group Ltd and Qantas Airways Ltd.
18. Results are available upon request. Similar conclusions pertain when the study period is alternatively 
partitioned into the sub-periods 2001–2006 and 2007–2010, and also when the period of greatest activity, 
2007–2008, is considered separately relative to the remaining eight years in the study period.
References
Agrawal A and Walkling R (1994) Executive careers and compensation surrounding takeover bids. Journal 
of Finance 49: 985–1014.
Austin R and Tuch A (2008) Private Equity and Corporate Control Transactions. Sydney, NSW, Australia: 
Ross Parsons Centre of Commercial Corporate and Taxation Law.
Bearle A and Means G (1932) The Modern Corporation and Private Property. New York: Macmillan 
Publishing Co.
Chan W and Emanuel D (2011) Board governance and acquirers’ returns: A study of Australian acquisitions. 
Australian Journal of Management 36: 174–199.
Chapple L, Clarkson P and King J (2010) Private equity bids in Australia: An exploratory study. Accounting 
and Finance 50: 79–102.
Chapple L, Clarkson P and King J (2011) Private equity bidders: Barbarians or best friends. Company and 
Securities Law Journal 29: 159–177.
Christensen J, Kent P, Routledge J, et al. (2014) Do corporate governance recommendations improve the 
performance and accountability of small listed companies? Accounting and Finance.
Christy JA, Matolcsy ZP and Wyatt A (2013) Do board characteristics influence the shareholders’ assessment 
of risk for small and large firms? Abacus 49: 161–196.
Demsetz H and Lehn K (1985) The structure of corporate ownership: Causes and consequences. Journal of 
Political Economy 93: 1155–1177.
Eisenberg T, Sundgren S and Wells MT (1998) Larger board size and decreasing firm value in small firms. 
Journal of Financial Economics 48: 35–54.
Fama E (1980) Agency problems and the theory of the firm. Journal of Political Economy 88: 288–307.
Fama E and Jensen M (1983) Separation of ownership and control. Journal of Law & Economics 26: 301–325.
Grossman S and Hart O (1980) Takeover bids, the free-rider problem and the theory of the corporation. Bell 
Journal of Economics 94: 1161–1204.
Gujarati DM (1995) Basic Econometrics. 3rd ed. New York: McGraw-Hill International Editions.
Hart O (1983) The market mechanism as an incentive scheme. Bell Journal of Economics 14: 366–382.
Hermalin B and Weisbach M (2003) Boards of directors as an endogenously determined institution: A Survey 
of the economic literature. Economic Policy Review 9: 7–26.
Huber P (1967) The behaviour of maximum likelihood estimates under non-standard conditions. In: Proceeding 
of the fifth Berkeley symposium on mathematical statistics and probability, vol. 1, pp. 221–233.
Jensen M (1986) Agency costs of free cash flow, corporate finance, and takeovers. American Economic 
Review 76: 323–329.
Jensen M (1988) Takeovers: Their causes and consequences. Journal of Economic Perspectives 2: 21–48.
Jensen M (2007) The economic case for private equity. Paper presented at the Harvard Business School 
centennial conference on private equity, New York, 13 February.
Jensen M and Meckling W (1976) Theory of the firm: Managerial behaviour, agency costs and ownership 
structure. Journal of Financial Economics 13: 305–360.
Jensen M and Ruback R (1983) The market for corporate control: The scientific evidence. Journal of Financial 
Economics 11: 5–50.
John K and Senbet LW (1998) Corporate governance and board effectiveness. Journal of Banking & Finance 
22: 371–403.
26 Australian Journal of Management 
Khan A, Mather P and Balachandran B (2014) Managerial share ownership and operating performance: Do 
independent and executive directors have different incentives? Australian Journal of Management 39: 
47–71.
Kini O, Kracaw W and Mian S (1995) Corporate takeovers, firm performance and board composition. Journal 
of Corporate Finance 1: 383–412.
Klein A (1998) Firm performance and board committee structure. Journal of Law & Economics 41: 275–303.
Larcker R, Richardson S and Tuna I (2007) Corporate governance, accounting outcomes and organisational 
performance. Accounting Review 82: 963–1008.
Lehn K and Poulsen A (1989) Free cash flow and stockholder gains in going private transactions. Journal of 
Finance 44: 771–787.
Lubotsky D and Wittenberg M (2006) Interpretation of regressions with multiple proxies. Review of Economics 
and Statistics 88: 549–562.
Manne H (1965) Mergers and the market for corporate control. Journal of Political Economy 73: 110–120.
Martin K and McConnell J (1991) Corporate performance, corporate takeovers and management turnover. 
Journal of Finance 46: 671–688.
Masulis R and Thomas R (2009) Does private equity create wealth? The effects of private equity and deriva-
tives on corporate governance. University of Chicago Law Review 76, 219–260.
Maug E (1998) Large shareholders as monitors: Is there a trade-off between liquidity and control. Journal of 
Finance 53: 65–98.
Metrick A and Yasuda A (2010) The economics of private equity funds. Review of Financial Studies 23: 
2303–2341.
Morck R, Shleifer A and Vishny R (1988) Characteristics of targets of hostile and friendly takeovers. In: 
Auerbach AJ (ed.) Corporate Takeovers Causes and Consequences. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago 
Press, pp. 101–129.
Osborne S, Katselas D and Chapple L (2012) The preferences of private equity investors in selecting target 
acquisitions: An international investigation. Australian Journal of Management 37: 361–389.
Renneboog L and Simons T (2005) Public-to-private transactions: LBOs, MBOs, MBIs and IBOs. European 
Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI), ECGI – Finance Working Paper No. 94/2005
Shivdasani A (1993) Board composition, ownership structure and hostile take-overs. Journal of Accounting 
& Economics 16: 167–198.
Shleifer A and Vishny R (1986) Large shareholders and corporate control. Journal of Political Economy 94: 
461–488.
Vafeas N (1999) Board meeting frequency and firm performance. Journal of Financial Economics 53: 113–
143.
Weir C and Wright M (2006) Governance and takeovers: Are public-to-private transactions different from 
traditional acquisitions of listed corporations? Accounting and Business Research 36: 289–307.
Weir C, Laing D and Wright M (2006) Public to private takeovers and the market for corporate control. 
Working paper, Aberdeen Business School, The Robert Gordon University.
Weisbach M (1992) Corporate governance and hostile takeovers. Journal of Accounting & Economics 16: 
199–208.
Weston F (1979) The tender takeover. Mergers and Acquisitions 74–82.
White H (1980) A heteroskedasticity-consistent covariance matrix estimator and a direct test for heteroske-
dasticity. Econometrica 48: 817–838.
Yermack D (1996) Higher market valuation of companies with a small board of directors. Journal of Financial 
Economics 40: 185–211.
Clarkson et al. 27
Appendix 1.
Hallmarks of the Australian private equity investment sector
The hallmarks of the Australian private equity investment sector, as outlined by a number of mar-
ket commentators, are presented below. The Australian Private Equity and Venture Capital 
Association Limited (AVCAL) is the central voice of the Australian private equity investment sec-
tor and represents almost all of the domestic, regional and global private equity firms active in 
Australia. In a 2007 Senate submission to the standing committee on economics, they detailed a 
number of mechanisms which were thought to add value to portfolio businesses, as follows.
The Reserve Bank of Australia (RBA) is Australia’s central bank and a primary financial regula-
tor: in a 2007 Financial Stability Review it examined the pivotal characteristics of the Australian 
private equity investment sector
Austin and Tuch (2008) investigated the key attributes of the private equity asset class, from an 
academic viewpoint, in their report ‘Private equity and corporate control transactions’, developed 
for the Ross Parsons Centre of Commercial Corporate and Taxation Law.
Finally, the Australian Council of Super Investors Inc (ASCI), which assists its member funds 
with the management of investment risk, commissioned a report to examine the central hallmarks 
of the Australian private equity investment sector.
Market Commentator Hallmarks of Australian private equity
AVCAL Alignment of interests between owners and managers of the firm;
 Long-term focus not compromised by short-termism;
 Detailed due diligence;
 Development of a comprehensive and coherent long-term plan for 
growth; and
 Active stewardship.
RBA Decisions are made in the long-term interests of the firm;
 Reduced governance burdens; and
 Better alignment of interests between owners and managers of the firm.
Austin and Tuch (2008) Targeting of poorly managed businesses;
 High level of debt funded by third party lenders;
 High gearing post-acquisition;
 Median- to long-term investment strategy;
 Control of the acquired business;
 Injection of management disciplines to achieve aggressive business plans.
ACSI Increased tax shields arising from high debt levels;
 Disciplining effect of debt (or face higher likelihood of bankruptcy);
 Increased monitoring by lenders reduces agency costs; and
 Improved management incentives and performance.
